Oops I forgot . . .
In my earlier blog, the point I was intending to make about risk links to a broader argument I heard made by Melanie Phillips (not someone I often find myself quoting!). Phillips’ contention is that middle class people adopt social norms e.g. recreational drug-taking, family break-up, which have considerable downsides but which they have the resources to deal with. The problem is that those norms filter down to less advantaged communities for whom the flipsides can be catastrophic. This is the argument I was thinking of – that we have a dominant culture that extols risk but the costs of risk are much easier to handle if you are well off.
Lessons learned . . .
Firstly, as regular readers will know, I am currently working on my Chief Executive’s Lecture for next Monday. One aspect of the speech is a review of the research around the idiosyncracies of human decision making. Having just watched two speakers, with at least one more to come, talking extensively on this subject, I have realised that this area, which is a popularisation of behavioural economics and social psychology, is becoming more than a little clichéd. So, I’ll be speaking less about that next week.
The second point comes from an entertaining presentation by Casper Berry and concerns risk – we live in a society that encourages risk but we are risk averse. However, in reality, the way risk is taken reflects inequality. Well-off people can take short term losses and wait for risk to pay off in the long term, and others, particularly those in the financial sector, can rig the system so they are almost certain to succeed. However, for those with fewer resources, risk is not such a good strategy. That is why, in the current credit crunch, people with big houses can afford to wait for another property boom, while those in smaller houses can find themselves out on the street.
No complaints this week
Another great week of events at the RSA. As well as the Ken Robinson tour de force on Monday, we had a really lively debate last night on the subject of privacy, which involved evidence and interrogation from 9 different people.
Yesterday afternoon I chaired the lunchtime debate with Julian Baggini, philosopher and author of Complaint, which I referred to earlier in the week. There were 2 particular observations I thought were worth sharing.
The first is his insight that risk aversion can be equally understood as responsibility aversion. When we say we are not willing to take a risk, equally we are saying we won’t take responsibility if that risk fails. So the problem with over-regulation and a litigious culture makes us fear we will be held responsible for the failure of risk.
The second is a rejoinder to those who equate risk aversion with an overbearing nanny state. Baggini argues convincingly that it is in fact the individualistic sense that if anything goes wrong in life, we should be able to blame someone, allied with the aggressive marketing of ‘no win, no fee’ compensation lawyers, that is an important driver.
As Fellows will know, we have our own Risk Commission here at the RSA and we are currently trying to raise money for a project on risk and aging to go alongside our successful risk and childhood work. Baggini’s perception is a useful corrective to some of the lazier thinking that can take place around risk.
I am continuing to work away at my 30 June lecture, veering between moments of inspiration and periods of panic! This morning, however, I found a single line which encapsulated the core argument I intend to make.
It is in the first chapter of Drew Westen’s influential book, The Political Brain. In arguing that politicians, particularly on the progressive wing, fail to understand the profound emotional nature of political affiliation, he described Democratic Party strategists as having an irrational emotional commitment to rationality.



